Comparison of Android-based Operating Systems

This is a comparison of popular Android "ROMs" (better term: AOSP distributions or Android-based OS). Please note I'm not affiliated with any of these projects and I am not giving any specific recommendation. If you think anything is factually incorrect, please let me know.

Comparison of Android-based Operating Systems

Source: eylenburg.github.io

Last updated: 29 November 2024

	GrapheneOS	DivestOS	CalyxOS	IodéOS	/e/	LineageOS	"Stock" Android
Based on	AOSP	LineageOS	AOSP	LineageOS	LineageOS	AOSP	AOSP
Freedom
Free and open source (FOSS)?	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
Deblobbed?	Yes, significantly	Yes, extensively	Yes, significantly	Yes, minimal	Yes, minimal	Yes, minimal	No
Features
Network controls for appsThe controls on LineageOS-based operating systems are leaky as their approach only disabled direct network access (socket) but doesn't disable indirect access via the INTERNET permission, which provides multiple ways of bypassing them not requiring collusion between apps. This functionality is regularly used by apps with no malicious intent. Collusion between apps is an issue for all kinds of granted access, permissions, etc. and not specific to the INTERNET permission. If INTERNET permission is not blocked though, no collusion is required.	Direct and indirect accessIn addition to blocking indirect access via INTERNET APIs, the GrapheneOS Network toggle also emulates the network being down and avoids running scheduled jobs which require the network.	Direct and indirect access	Direct access only	Direct access only	Direct access only	Direct access only	No
Network-based location (without GNSS)	Emulated default, or Play ServicesEmulated by default (redirect to GNSS-based location), can use sandboxed Google Play via toggles when installed	No	microG location	microG location	microG location	No	Play Services
System-wide connection/tracker blocking	Private DNS setting, or via VPN app	hosts file, Private DNS, or VPN	Private DNS setting, or via VPN app	iode-snort app, Private DNS, or VPN	Private DNS setting, or via VPN app	Private DNS setting, or via VPN app	Private DNS setting, or via VPN app
E2E-encrypted phone backups	Yes (Seedvault)	Yes (Seedvault)	Yes (Seedvault)	Yes (Seedvault)	Yes (Seedvault)	Yes (Seedvault)	Yes, but requires Google login
Notification forwarding from other user profiles	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	No
Duress PIN (to wipe device)	Yes, see here	No	No	No	No	No	No
Android Auto compatible	Yes (sandboxed), see hereGrapheneOS has permission toggles to enable the user to provide the least amount of permissions necessary (e.g. wired Android Auto requires only USB access).	No	No	Yes, see here	Yes, see here	No	Yes
Google Pay compatible	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
Degoogling (connections to Google)
eSIM activation	Google eUICC w/o data sharingDisabled by default. Unlike the regular Google eUICC management app, it doesn't require Google Play and cannot share data with it. It doesn't communicate with Google servers unless the carrier is hosting with them, which would involve using their servers regardless.	OpenEUICC	Google eUICC (preinstalled)	Google eUICC (preinstalled)	Google eUICC (preinstalled)	Google eUICC (preinstalled)	Google eUICC (preinstalled)
Provider for network-based location	Emulated/GNSS default, or GoogleEmulated by default (redirect to GNSS-based location), can use sandboxed Google Play via toggles when installed	n/a	microG location	microG location	microG location	n/a	Google
SUPL	GrapheneOS default, Google or none	Google default, or none	Google default, or none	Google default, or none	None default, or Google	Google default, or none	Google
PSDS - Google Pixel 6 and laterThe default server used depends on the GPS chipset, e.g. phones with Qualcomm chips (e.g. Snapdragon) connect to a Qualcomm server, while newer Google Pixels with Tensor chips connect to a Google server, and other phones with Broadcom GPS (e.g. Exynos) connect to a Broadcom server. Some ROMs override these settings. Click here for details and which device information are sent.	GrapheneOS default, Google, or none	Broadcom default, or none	Broadcom default, or none	Broadcom default, or none	None default, or Google	Google default, or none	Google
Connectivity check/captive portal	GrapheneOS default, Google, or none	Multiple presets offered	Google (can be changed)can be changed with `adb` command	Kuketz.de	Murena.io	Google (can be changed)can be changed with `adb` command	Google (can be changed)can be changed with `adb` command
DNS connectivity check	GrapheneOS default, or Google	Google	Google	Google	Google	Google	Google
DNS server fallback	Cloudflare	Quad9	Cloudflare	Quad9	Quad9	Google	Google
Network time	GrapheneOS default, or none	NTP.org (can be changed)Server pool with arbitrary providers, which can include Google-hosted servers or even malicious servers. NTP server can be changed with `adb` command. & carrier	Google (can be changed)can be changed with `adb` command & carrier	NTP.org (can be changed)Server pool with arbitrary providers, which can include Google-hosted servers or even malicious servers. NTP server can be changed with `adb` command. & carrier	NTP.org (can be changed)Server pool with arbitrary providers, which can include Google-hosted servers or even malicious servers. NTP server can be changed with `adb` command. & carrier	Google (can be changed)can be changed with `adb` command & carrier	Google (can be changed)can be changed with `adb` command & carrier
Hardware attestation provisioning	GrapheneOS default, or Google	Google	Google	Google	Google	Google	Google
DRM (Widevine) provisioning	GrapheneOS default, or Google	DRM not supported	Google	Google	Google	Google	Google
Google Play Services
Implementation	GmsCompat (sandboxed Google Play)GrapheneOS does not include Google Play as a preinstalled app, but it includes an open source compatibility layer for users who choose to use it. Users can alternatively install microG on GrapheneOS, albeit GrapheneOS does not support signature spoofing. Not all microG functionality requires signature spoofing, for example FCM works with microG without signatures spoofing to the extent it works without special privileges (e.g. microG needs to use a privileged API to wake apps and keep them awake for a short period of time to handle FCM messages).	microG	microG	microG	microG	None by default. It's possible to install microG manually (LineageOS supports signature spoofing for microG since 2024). Alternatively, there are ROMs with microG preinstalled or one can add Google apps during the installation process, but this is not officially supported by LineageOS.	Google Play Services
Optional?	Yes (not preinstalled)	Yes (not preinstalled)	Yes (preinstalled but opt-out)	Yes (preinstalled but opt-out)	No (preinstalled without opt-out)		No (preinstalled without opt-out)
Runs in standard app sandbox?	Yes	Yes	NoRuns in the `priv_app` SELinux domain instead of `untrusted_app`, which gives it access to internal system APIs and data along with it being much less isolated.	NoRuns in the `priv_app` SELinux domain instead of `untrusted_app`, which gives it access to internal system APIs and data along with it being much less isolated.	NoRuns in the `priv_app` SELinux domain instead of `untrusted_app`, which gives it access to internal system APIs and data along with it being much less isolated.		NoRuns in the `priv_app` SELinux domain instead of `untrusted_app`, which gives it access to internal system APIs and data along with it being much less isolated.
Can be limited to user or work profile?	Yes	Yes	Yes	? (TBC)	? (TBC)		No
Signature spoofing needed/allowed?	No	Only for Google signature	Only for Google signature	Allowed for any app & signatureClick here for details	Allowed for any app & signatureClick here for details		No
Push notifications via Google FCM?	Yes	Optional	Optional	Optional	Optional		Yes
Google Play Integrity?	Passes Basic Integrity only, see herePasses MEETS_BASIC_INTEGRITY but not MEETS_DEVICE_INTEGRITY or MEETS_STRONG_INTEGRITY which require a certification from Google.	No	No	No	No		Yes
Privacy
Storage scopes	Yes, see here	No	No	No	No	No	No
Contact scopes	Yes, see here	No	No	No	No	No	No
Per-app sensor controls	Yes, see here	Yes	No	No	No	No	No
Per-connection DHCP state flushing	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No	No
MAC address randomization	Per connection, see here	Per connection	Per network	Per network	Per network	Per network	Per network
SUPL: IMSI or phone number sent?	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
PSDS: user agent sent?May include chipset serial number, device manufacturer and model, carrier, and Android version. Click here for details and which device information are sent.	No	No (device-specific), see here	Partially for Qualcomm chipsChipset serial number is stripped out but other less unique device information remain	Partially for Qualcomm chipsChipset serial number is stripped out but other less unique device information remain	Partially for Qualcomm chipsChipset serial number is stripped out but other less unique device information remain	Partially for Qualcomm chipsChipset serial number is stripped out but other less unique device information remain	for Qualcomm GPS chips
Closed cross-profile package leaks?	Yes	Partially	No	No	No	No	No
Closed device identifier leaks?	Yes, see here	No	No	No	No	No	No
Metadata stripping for screenshots	Yes, see here	Yes, see here	Yes, see here	No	No	No	No
EXIF metadata stripping for photos	Yes, see here	No	No	No	Available as option	No	No
Tracking through Android Advertising ID?	Not part of the systemif Play Services are installed by the user, the Advertising ID can be deleted in settings	Not part of the systemif microG is installed by the user, it will generate a random Advertising ID for each request	Randomized IDmicroG will generate a random advertising ID for each request	Randomized IDmicroG will generate a random advertising ID for each request	Randomized IDmicroG will generate a random advertising ID for each request	Not part of the systemif microG is installed by the user, it will generate a random Advertising ID for each request; if Play Services are installed by the user, the Advertising ID can be deleted in settings	Yes, but can be deleted in settings
Security
Verified boot (if supported by device)?	Yes, incl. system app updates	Yes, but excl. system app updates	Yes, but excl. system app updates	Yes, but excl. system app updates	w/ test keys; excl. system app updates	No	Yes, but excl. system app updates
Hardware-based security verification	Yes, see here	No	No	No	No	No	Some devices, see here
System app downgrade protection	For updates and boot, with fs-verity	For updates and boot	For updates (incomplete)	For updates (incomplete)	For updates (incomplete)	For updates (incomplete)	For updates (incomplete)
Secure application spawning?	Yes (exec)	Yes (exec)	No	No	No	No	No
Hardened memory allocator?	Yes	YesPatches taken from GrapheneOS	No	No	No	No	No
Hardware memory tagging?	Yes, if supported by device	No	No	No	No	No	No
Hardened kernel?	Yes, highest	Yes, high (device-specific)Patches taken from GrapheneOS	No	No	No	No	No
Hardened libc?	Yes, highest	Yes, highPatches taken from GrapheneOS	No	No	No	No	No
Hardened webview?	Yes (Vanadium)	Yes (Mulch)Patches taken from GrapheneOS	No	No	No	No	No
Hardened SELinux policy?	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	No
Android Runtime JITJust-In-Time compilation/profiling	AOTAhead-Of-Time compilation w/o profiling	Interpreter/JITJust-In-Time with profiling	Interpreter/JITJust-In-Time with profiling	Interpreter/JITJust-In-Time with profiling	Interpreter/JITJust-In-Time with profiling	Interpreter/JITJust-In-Time with profiling	Interpreter/JITJust-In-Time with profiling
Dynamic code loading prevention for appssee here for details	System, opt-in for non-system apps	None	None	None	None	None	None
Additional hardening	Highest, see here	Medium, see here	No	No	No	No	No
Secure TLS for SUPL?	TLSv1.2	TLSv1.2 if supported by device	TLSv1.1 or TLSv1.0	TLSv1.1 or TLSv1.0	TLSv1.1 or TLSv1.0	TLSv1.1 or TLSv1.0	TLSv1.1 or TLSv1.0
Fallback DNS server with DNSSEC?	Yes	Yes	Yes	Nouses Quad9's unsecured endpoint (9.9.9.10) with provides no security blacklist and no DNSSEC	Yes	Yes	Yes
Can disable USB-C and pogo pins data?See here for details: [1], [2], [3]	Default (while locked), see here	No	No	No	No	No	No
Can disable USB-C charging?See here for details: [1], [2], [3]	Opt-in (after boot), see here	No	No	No	No	No	No
Can disable USB connections?See here for details: [1], [2], [3]	Default (while locked), see hereHardware and software	? (TBC - like Lineage or stock?)	Default (while locked), software onlyIncomplete implementation. Can only disable high level software attack surface. Cannot disable USB until after early boot. Lacks a way to block new USB connections without ending existing connections. The mode for disabling USB connections while locked continues allowing new connections until existing connections end, including a connection through another method such as a pogo pins USB connection to a stand.	? (TBC - like Lineage or stock?)	? (TBC - like Lineage or stock?)	Opt-in, software onlyIncomplete implementation. Can only disable high level software attack surface. Cannot disable USB until after early boot. Lacks a way to block new USB connections without ending existing connections. The mode for disabling USB connections while locked continues allowing new connections until existing connections end, including a connection through another method such as a pogo pins USB connection to a stand.	Device admin APIRequires installing a device admin app like Sentry. Can only disable high level software attack surface. Cannot disable USB until after early boot. Lacks a way to block new USB connections without ending existing connections.
Secure connection to network time server?	HTTPS via GrapheneOS server	NTP w/o NTS and carrier-based timeinsecure because cellular networks lack proper authentication	NTP w/o NTS and carrier-based timeinsecure because cellular networks lack proper authentication	NTP w/o NTS and carrier-based timeinsecure because cellular networks lack proper authentication	NTP w/o NTS and carrier-based timeinsecure because cellular networks lack proper authentication	NTP w/o NTS and carrier-based timeinsecure because cellular networks lack proper authentication	NTP w/o NTS and carrier-based timeinsecure because cellular networks lack proper authentication
Updates
Security update speed (AOSP subset of ASB)It doesn't include information on how the device-related patches in the 2nd half of each ASB (Android Security Bulletin) get shipped, if they do at all. It's also missing the fact that full security patches require the latest monthly/quarterly/yearly updates. Additionally, you need to keep up with the vendor's releases which means falling behind on quarterly or yearly releases results in missing many of the High/Critical severity patches for Pixels or another device launching the new quarterly/yearly version in a reasonable time. The issue is that this heavily varies by device. Pixels require the alternate OS to always keep up to ship updates. Some other device ship yearly updates quickly too. Devices not shipping the latest OS release make it harder for the alternate OS to do it but it is possible, especially if they don't build the vendor image, etc. If the vendor doesn't ship the releases, then the firmware/driver code used from them will be missing the patches. For example, Fairphone is consistently 1 or 2 months behind on the Android Security Bulletin patches so CalyxOS, LineageOS, etc. on it is at least that far behind at all times for the non-AOSP half of the ASB. This is one of the reasons why GrapheneOS currently only supports Google Pixel devices. Every other OEM doesn't ship the monthly/quarterly updates and typically has major delays for yearly updates. Most also do a bad job shipping the backported patches. Click here for update speed data	Usually same day	1-2 weeks	Days to weeks	2-4 weeks, sometimes longer	1-2 months, sometimes longer	1-2 weeks, sometimes longer	Depends on phone vendor
Full patches on fully supported devicesRequires 1. being on the latest OS release (as Android doesn't backport all security patches), 2. shipping all the vendor code	Several days	Many months to over a year	Weeks to months	Several to many months	Many months to over a year	Several to many months	Depends on phone vendor
Partial security updates (ASB) after EoL datemissing most driver and firmware patches after the phone's end of life date	until 5 years from launche.g. 2 years of extended support for 4th and 5th generation Pixels	Several years	1-3 years	Several years	Several years	Several years	By definition: No
Number of Android versions supportedOnly the latest major release of AOSP has full security patches. Most privacy fixes are in fact only included for the new OS versions, not in the security patches. The ASB patches patches rarely include fixes for permission model / sandbox flaws resulting in privacy leaks since they're given Moderate severity and often require invasive changes including potential compatibility breaks.	Usually 1 Android version	7 Android versions (incl. backports)	Usually 1 Android version	Usually 1 Android version	2-3 Android versions	Usually 3 Android versions	Usually 3 Android versions
Webview update speedClick here for details	<2 days	<2 days	<1 week, sometimes longer delays	<2 weeks	Several weeks/months	<2 weeks	Depends on phone vendor
Supported devices	Hardware requirements		Hardware requirements
Asus*	No	Older devices only	No	No	Older devices only	Older devices only	Yes (ZenUI)
Fairphone	No	Older devices only	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Google	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Motorola	No	Older devices only	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Oneplus	No	Older devices only	No	Older devices only	Older devices only	Yes	Yes (OxygenOS)
Samsung*	No	Older devices only	No	Older devices only	Older devices only	Older devices only	Yes (OneUI)
Sony	No	Older devices only	No	Older devices only or GSIGSI available for Xperia 5 V	Older devices only	Yes	Yes
Xiaomi	No	Older devices only	No	Older devices only	Older devices only	Yes	Yes (HyperOS)
* these manufacturers don't support bootloader unlocking anymore for all or most of their new devices. "Older devices only" = no devices released since 2023.

Appendix: using different profiles in Android

It is possible to use different profiles to separate apps, files and other data from each other. From least to most separate from the main user profile, the options are: work profile, private space (since Android 15), and secondary users. Below is a comparison how they differ: